Land - Trusts & Coownership - Cases (4)

Trust (cont'd)

Oxley v Hiscock (2004)
- CA considered that, where two persons contributed to the purchase of land conveyed into the name of one of them and where there was no agreement about the quantification of their respective shares, the court was entitled to take into account the whole course of conduct between the parties in determining what would be a fair share.
- From the decision in this case, it appears that the boundary between resulting and constructive trusts has shifted again. The CA stated that the relevant case authorities were unclear and that the trial judge had used the outdated and artificial approach of looking at the conduct of the parties throughout their relationship to see if a common intention could be inferred at the time the property had been purchased. A better approach would be to look at the situation from the perspective of overall fairness; that in such cases, once evidence had been found that the parties had intended shared ownership of some form, each party should be entitled ‘to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property.’ On the facts, given the defendant’s greater financial contribution, an equal division was not ‘fair’ overall
- Follow Cooke (Court will fall back to resulting trust principle of distribution based on original contribution only as last resort)

Cox v Jones (2004)
- In the recent case of Cox v Jones [2004], the parties were barristers who met in 1997 and became engaged in February 1998. Shortly after their engagement, Miss Cox moved in with Mr Jones, but the relationship was stormy and, three months later. Miss Cox moved out. The relationship continued. Miss Cox claimed that the engagement also continued, although Mr Jones denied this. The relationship itself lasted until May 2001, when it broke down permanently. Miss Cox claimed that the engagement had continued until May 2001.
Following the breakdown of the relationship. Miss Cox asserted the following claims:
The flat: that Mr Jones had purchased a flat as nominee for Miss Cox and held it on trust for her absolutely.
The Mill: that a second property. The Mill, which was purchased solely by Mr Jones, was held on trust for Miss Cox and Mr Jones in equal shares.
Beneficial interest in property
Once it has been determined that there was an agreement to marry, what legal claims are available to engaged couples over and above those available to couples who simply cohabit? Where an agreement to marry is terminated, such as in Cox v Jones, either party can apply under sl7 Married Women's Property Act 1882 (MWPA) in respect of any property over which either or both of them asserts a beneficial interest.
The MWPA is essentially a procedural provision to resolve questions as to title and is not a means of giving a title not previously in existence. The property must have been in existence whilst the agreement to marry was in force. However, under s7 Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act 1958, a claim can still be brought over property which no longer exists.
Section 2 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (LRMPA) 1970 extends the class of potential litigants to engaged couples, as long as the claim is made within three years of the end of the engagement.
The applicant in the case of Mossop v Mossap [1998] relied on the LRMPA 1970. The judgment focused on whether engaged couples could rely on the same rights as married couples with regard to property. The applicant argued that, under the 1970 Act, beneficial rights were extended to protect engaged parties. Therefore, she claimed that the court should either order the transfer of part of her former fiancé’s interest in one of the houses he owned to her, or there should be an order for sale with the proceeds divided proportionately. She had not made any contribution to the purchase of the property in question, but it had been purchased during the engagement and they had lived there together.
The court dismissed her appeal, stating that while it was clear that parliament intended engaged couples to have similar protection to married couples, the drafting of s24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 necessarily barred engaged couples. The right to an order for sale or transfer could only be triggered following a decree for divorce, a decree of nullity, or a decree of judicial separation. Clearly, none of these applied to a couple who had never married and, therefore, there was no reasonable cause of action and the appeal was dismissed.
Balcombe LJ summarised as follows:
The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Pro-visions) Act 1970, s2, provides that engaged couples would have the right of husband and wife in relation to property but that means the right to apply as a husband and wife have a right to apply; it clearly does not mean, in my judgement, they have rights of divorced husbands and wives under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, so there is no jurisdiction to make a transfer of property order.
The decision
In summary, Mann J reached the following decision in the case of Cox v Jones:
The flat: Miss Cox was entitled to a declaration that she owned 100 of the beneficial interest in the flat. The basis of the purchase of the flat was that Mr Jones was purchasing the flat for Miss Cox as her nominee and not in his own right. Miss Cox had stopped her attempt to find alter-native methods of funding the purchase; she switched die purchase to joint names, then acquiesced in a purchase in Mr Jones' sole name and managed the flat thereafter. Those facts made it inequitable for Mr Jones to seek to claim the flat for himself and he therefore held it on constructive trust for Miss Cox absolutely.
The Mill: there was found to be an arrangement or intention about joint ownership of The Mill, but not as to the proportions of that ownership. Miss Cox's interest had to be such as the court considered to be 'fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between the parties in relation to the property'. Miss Cox had made a significant contribution to the extensive works done on The Mill, had stopped work to do so, and should therefore be entitled to 25 of the beneficial interest in The Mill.

Lightfoot v Lightfoot-Brown (2005)
- The claimant and the respondent were previously married. During ancillary relief proceedings the claimant agreed to transfer his share in the former matrimonial home to the respondent. Shortly after the divorce was finalized, the parties were reconciled and the claimant continued to live with the respondent in the former matrimonial home. The parties also agreed to re-marry and discussed redistributing their assets before the relationship broke down permanently.
- During this period, the claimant transferred the property to the respondent in accordance with the agreement reached during the ancillary relief proceedings but continued to make regular payments towards the mortgage, including one large capital payment. Furhter, the claimant paid for several improvements to the property. Based on these payments, the claimant said that he had acquired a beneficial interest in the property. The judge held that where there was no agreement or understanding between the parties that the claimant should have such an interest, the mere fact that he had made these payments could not give rise to and equitable interest.
- On Appeal, the claimant contended that the requirement for communication between the parties had been dispensed with by the recent case of Oxley v Hiscock (2004), which the trial judge had failed to consider. However, CA reaffirmed the need for communication between the parties as set out in Springette v Defoe (1992). Further the Court held that the need for communication could only be dispensed with when determining the size of the claimant’s share.
- The moral of the story is to ensure that intentions / beliefs as to beneficial ownership of a property are communicated and not to assume that another’s understanding of the arrangement accords with your own.

Curley v Parkes (2004)
- Curley v Parkes [2004] All ER (D) 344, states that any resulting trust arising with respect to property bought in the name of another will arise (if at all) at the time of the purchase.
- The claimant and defendant had been cohabiting in a house bought by the defendant and registered in her sole name. The claimant's employer subsequently required him to relocate.
- His employer offered financial help with the moving costs and with the purchase of a new property. As a result, the employer bought the property from the defendant. Then, in April 2001, another property was bought in the defendant's name alone. It was paid for by the proceeds of the old property, a mortgage in the defendant's sole name, and cash paid by the defendant. The defendant paid no part of the purchase price, despite receiving money under the relocation scheme. He also received a payment each month from his employer with respect to the higher mortgage payments.
- Between May and November 2001, the claimant paid the defendant about £9,000 in six instalments. This was to compensate the defendant for the deposit on the new property and for legal and removal expenses.
- On the subsequent break up of the relationship, the claimant argued that the property was held on a resulting trust by the defendant for the defendant and claimant. The claimant argued that that he had contributed to the purchase price of the property by the payments he had made in 2001.
- The court held that where property is bought in the name of another, a resulting trust would arise once and for all at the date the property was acquired. In this case, the court decided, there were no findings of fact to support the claimant's view that his payments of £ 9,000 (paid to compensate the defendant for the deposit, and in respect of legal expenses and removal costs had contributed to the purchase price of the property. Therefore, the claimant had no beneficial interest in the property under a resulting trust.

Burns v Burns (1984)
- This was a significant decision in respect of the ‘family home’. It dealt with a situation where a party (here the woman) who was not on the legal title but made an INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION to the acquisition of the property.
- The decision demonstrated that co-habiting couples do not enjoy statutory proection when a relationship breaks down. Further, it marked a decision retreat from the ‘new model constructive trust’. In holding that that the contributions of the woman did not give rise to a constructive trust in her favour CA was clearly stating that it did not have a broad adjustive discretion to impose a constructive trust in order to achieve a fair result. It is most unlikely that a ‘Denning CA’ would have achieved the same result. Further, the court concluded that there was no evidence of any agreement between the parties to share ownership of the house.
- no direct contribution: no resulting trust
- no intention: no contructive trust
-> Mrs. Burns got nothing